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The Domestic, Institutional, and International Factors of U.S. Congressional Foreign 
Policy: The 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act 
 The United States Congress plays a large role in the foreign policy process, yet this is 
frequently overlooked.  The President of the United States is often believed to have a greater 
amount of control over foreign policy than over domestic policy.  This belief was especially 
strong during the Cold War era of 1945 to 1989.  On a few occasions (for example the 
congressional override of President Nixon’s veto for the 1973 War Powers Act) the Congress has 
challenged the presidential foreign policy agenda.  But in order for the Congress to challenge a 
president, public support of the American people is required to provide the rationale for doing so.  
This was the case in 1986 when Congress overrode President Ronald Reagan’s veto for limited 
economic sanctions against South Africa.  A cursory examination of these events leads one to 
conclude that the people’s will can prompt Congress to act, confronting the president when he is 
perceived to be out of touch with issues. However, the seemingly simple act of Congress 
responding to public demand is not the entire story, as a deeper analysis reveals the process to be 
more complex. 
 Politics in general and congressional politics in particular is a game of chance and 
opportunity.  In regard to the economic sanctions against South Africa, the Congressional Black 
Caucus (CBC) played a major role in the surprising passage of the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act.  
Without their consistent dedication to economic sanctions against South Africa since 1971 the 
1986 Anti-Apartheid Act may have never occurred.  Even after fifteen years of attempting 
sanctions the CBC still needed a lot of assistance to make their cause a leading issue for the 
United States Congress to address.  The Congressional Black Caucus not only depended on 
public opinion, they used the media to help convince other members of Congress that economic 
Congressional Anti-Apartheid Policy 4 
 
sanctions were a leading issue for the American public.  Both houses of Congress then took 
action to meet the public demand for economic sanctions.  This was the only way that a mere 
twenty out of a total of five hundred and thirty five congressional members (100 Senators and 
435 Representatives) could set forth motions to impose what has been believed by many people 
to be a major piece of congressional legislation.1  This legislation led the rest of the world to 
reconsider how to deal with the racial injustice that took place in South Africa.            
 The CBC’s appeal to the media caused the rest of Congress, Democrats and Republicans 
alike, to respond to their lead. If not they would have forfeited any opportunity that the media 
presented to enhance their public image. In general, Congressional members do not like to pass 
up media opportunities to increase their power in governmental matters.   For some, such 
opportunities are a way to make a name for themselves with the general public and for others it is 
a chance to flaunt their already established congressional influence. This is not to say that in this 
case all congressional members treated the issue with cynicism; for some it was a just cause. 
However, the single most important goal for any congressional member is re-election. 
There were three responses that were available to Congressional members.  The only 
viable option for any Democrat was to support the CBC and push for economic sanctions.  
African Americans are an important group for the Democratic Party.  The CBC could use this 
reality as leverage to sway other Democrats to support their cause. For Republicans there were 
two options to choose from: side with the Democrats, or support President Reagan.  Republicans 
that chose to support the Democrats did so in an attempt either to gain more African American 
votes, or to avoid being viewed as ignoring popular sentiment for sanctions against South Africa.  
The Republicans that elected to support the president’s foreign policy initiative focused on how 
                                                     
 1Nadine Cohodas, “Black House Members Striving for Influence,” Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report 43, no. 15 (13 April 1985): 675. 
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the apartheid government was both a stable regime as well as a reliable ally in southern Africa 
against the Soviet Union.   
 The key political concern for Democrats in the 99th Congress (1985 and 1986) was to re-
establish themselves with the American public.  The Democratic Party was the minority of the 
two parties with control of only the House of Representatives, whereas the Republicans 
controlled the presidency and the Senate.  Any congressional legislation that was considered to 
be a Democratic initiative would need to have Republican support to pass through the Senate.  
The anti-apartheid legislation posed a dilemma for Democrats, and especially for CBC members.  
To push for harsh economic sanctions would have caused Republican Senate support to dwindle.  
Yet by allowing Senate Republicans to play a major role in the crafting of the legislation, the 
original goal of the Democrats was diluted from harsh economic sanctions, to far less severe 
economic consequences for South Africa.  Either way the Democrats had to compromise, but by 
deciding to pursue a bipartisan compromise, the Congress was able to claim its action caused a 
major policy change towards the South African apartheid government. 
 The reason for Republican support of sanctions was not to gain the upper hand against 
the Democrats.  In the House, the Democrats held a sizeable majority, so House Republicans had 
to take this into consideration when deciding whether to support economic sanctions against 
South Africa.  Republican House members may not have agreed with the House Democratic 
initiative, but as they were greatly outnumbered, many House Republicans decided to vote in 
favour of the House legislation. The Senate Republicans held a slim majority, but were in a very 
powerful position to help establish legislation for South African sanctions.     
 The media also played a significant role in regard to South African economic sanctions.  
This is not to say that the media had a set agenda in favour of economic sanctions.  Rather, they 
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favoured stories that would garner a great deal of interest: first, the sit-ins led by Randall 
Robinson of TransAfrica in response to the apartheid government of South Africa; second, the 
domestic bloodshed in South Africa that was being shown on a daily basis; third, the domestic 
marches in the United States against apartheid (after the sit-in success); fourth, the power 
struggles within Congress; and fifth, the positioning of foreign policy towards South Africa 
between Congress and the President Reagan.  With these five scenarios, each of which involved 
South Africa, the media was able to maintain coverage on the public debate on American foreign 
policy towards the South African government.  This continuous coverage lasted from November 
1984 until the passage of the Anti-Apartheid Act in October 1986.   
 TransAfrica and the Congressional Black Caucus had together devised a political tactic to 
use public opinion, through the use of the news media, as the driving force that would realize the 
CBC’s aims of economic sanctions against the apartheid government of South Africa.  
TransAfrica was the main foreign policy lobby in the U.S. against the apartheid government in 
South Africa.  The CBC members with House seniority were aware that through their status on 
committee and sub-committee chairs they could dictate the proceedings in the House of 
Representatives. The CBC was determined to use the sit-in success as a means to challenge the 
status quo on an issue they knew was secondary to President Reagan, but one that he would still 
attempt to uphold.  They were prepared for the challenge, for they felt confident that they could 
gain some concessions from the president’s stated position of ‘constructive engagement’ towards 
South Africa.  With the public on their side, the CBC was certain that this would gain bi-partisan 
support. 
 With all the events that took place, the Congressional Black Caucus was able to start a 
firestorm in the domestic, institutional, and international affairs of the U.S. government.  The 
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result was one that saw a minority view in Congress gain enough momentum, with the use of 
political pluralism, to challenge an elitist foreign policy of the president.  The Congress was 
perceived to have the support of the people whereas the president did not, and the Congress used 
the will of the people to attack the position of President Reagan.  In perspective, one could say 
that the congressional realism of the U.S. Congress won a political battle over the political 
realism of Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy toward South Africa.  Congressional realism varied 
within the House and Senate as well as among Democrats and Republicans.  Congressional 
realism used domestic politics as a wedge to influence foreign policy.  Reagan’s political realism 
wanted to keep the domestic aspect separate from U.S. foreign policy.  In this instance it was 
conclusive that Congress was successful and the president was not.  Yet if this act was such a 
monumental change in foreign policy towards South Africa, why was a Democratic Congress not 
able to pass harsher economic sanctions in 1987 or 1988 that would have met the measures 
approved by the House of Representatives in 1986? 
 The 1986 passage of economic sanctions toward South Africa was a perfect storm that 
comes around once or twice in a political lifetime.  Without the elements of media coverage and 
public opinion to create the political will for Congress the1986 sanctions would likely never have 
occurred.   
 My intent is not to judge between President Reagan’s policy of ‘constructive 
engagement’ or the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act and determine which one was better. Rather, my 
objective is to analyse the events that lead to the 1986 economic sanctions as the foreign policy 
to move along the end of apartheid in South Africa.  Personally, I feel the 1986 proposed House 
sanctions were the best of all scenarios over both the president’s foreign policy and the 1986 
congressional sanctions.  Yet I believe that President Reagan’s policy was more polished as a 
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finished product than the legislative policy passed by Congress.  The bi-partisan commitment of 
1986 weakened the economic bite of the original intent of the House, and especially the CBC.  
The Senate Republicans weakened the House version, which resulted in a hindrance to the South 
African economy but not one that led to its undoing.  But it did make President Reagan change 
his approach toward South Africa.  Reagan’s foreign policy attempted to bring about a change in 
South Africa in a manner consistent with his overall Cold War foreign policy.  The irony was 
that Reagan seemed more afraid of losing to the congressional demands than he ever was about 
his South African foreign policy.  South Africa was a secondary matter to most, but to the 
Congressional Black Caucus it was a prominent item on their foreign policy agenda.   
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
 Between the two legislative houses of Congress, the House of Representatives had 
consistently pushed for harsher economic sanctions due to its large Democrat advantage.  This 
created the popular belief that the House led the drive for sanctions while the Senate was forced 
to react to the House initiative.  However, even though the House may have dictated the act of 
sanctions, the Senate’s forced response did not necessarily mean the House led the way.  The 
Republican Senate was forced to make some concessions, but in no way were they forced by the 
House to follow its lead, due to the Republicans having control of the Senate. 
The House of Representatives  
 In the House, the Democrats held a decisive majority advantage to control voting (253 
Democrats versus 182 Republicans).2  Virtually any Republican support would have made for 
enough votes to overturn any presidential veto.  The House Democrat support could be counted 
on due to the party supporting a CBC initiative.  House Republicans kept this substantial 
                                                     
 2Alan Ehrenhalt, “Failed Campaign Cost Republicans the Senate,” Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report 44, no. 45 (8 November 1986): 2803. 
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numerical disadvantage in mind when voting for sanctions. Though a number of Republicans 
voted with the Democrats, they did so out of the political reality of the situation.   A close 
examination of the House voting records revealed that a majority of House Republicans actually 
voted against the 1985 House Bill before voting for the bill in 1986.3 One example of this House 
Republican voting behaviour was that of Representative Newt Gingrich (R-GA).   
 Congressman Gingrich was believed to have been consistent in his support for economic 
sanctions against South Africa.  Yet this belief could be considered odd since he had also been 
consistent in his rhetoric for opposing communism in other parts of the globe. Buttressing this 
concern was the belief that punishing the apartheid government would weaken a non-communist 
ally.  This claim was very common among congressional Republicans who were against South 
African sanctions.   
 Some such as Michael Clough believe that Rep. Gingrich voted for sanctions as an 
attempt to gain more African American support for the Republican Party.4  The belief raised by 
Clough is a valid point but he attributed this act of support by Gingrich as done from a position 
of compromise.5  However, Clough did not consider the alternative reason of Gingrich voting 
with the stronger House position due to the amount of Democrat support for sanctions.  This 
position (chosen by a minority of House Republicans with a total of fifty-six votes in 1985, but 
in 1986 with a numerical majority of ninety House Republican votes) reveals that Republicans 
finally decided to side with the majority and chose to be seen as winning the political battle.6  
Yet the overall voting record indicated that this was done by a large number of House 
                                                     
 3“CQ House Votes 129-134,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 43, no. 23 (8 June 1985): 
1130; “CQ House Votes 351-357,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 44, no. 38 (20 September 
1986): 2236.     
 4Michael Clough, “Beyond Constructive Engagement,” Foreign Policy no. 61 (Winter, 1985-1986): 
16-17.  
 5Ibid., 16.  
 6“House Votes,” (8 June 1985):1130; “House Votes, “(20 Sept. 1986): 2236.  
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Republicans only after the political reality of sanctions was clearly evident (with Gingrich as the 
prime example).  Even more surprising when taking into consideration Clough’s view is that it 
seemed he overlooked that Rep. Gingrich actually voted against the 1985 version of the House 
bill H.R. 1460, the Anti-Apartheid Act.7  Clough’s article was published before the 1986 
sanctions debate started.  Therefore, any perspective informed by Clough’s argument, given the 
recorded voting records, must consider that the House Republican compromise of “limited 
sanctions” must have followed the Senate Republican agenda/strategy very closely.8   
 The passage of the Senate version in October 1986 could illuminate that the House was 
not controlled but was only dictated by the political design of the House Democrats, led by the 
CBC.  Thus, what finally convinced a number of Republicans to vote for the bill was that the 
House had accepted the Senate version over their own.  And with the House accepting the Senate 
version over their own, how much control could House Democrats have over the proceedings? 
 House Democrats were believed to have led the charge for economic sanctions against 
South Africa.  With regards to a sanction agenda, Rep. Julian Dixon (D-Calif.) said, “We (the 
CBC) have collaborated with ... TransAfrica...to seek congressional support for stronger policies 
against apartheid.”9  This statement by Congressman Dixon had been an official CBC position 
since the start of the Reagan administration in 1981.10  Given the context of the South African 
sanctions debate that took place during 1985 and 1986, it seems evident that the House 
Democrats were determined to use their numerical advantage against their fellow House 
Republicans.  Dixon’s statement indicates that TransAfrica would help in this effort by lobbying 
for (mainly public) support to first get full congressional Democrat support; and then to use both 
                                                     
 7Congressional Record 131, no. 73 (5 June 1985): H 3854.  
 8Clough, 17.  
 9Julian Dixon, “The Congressional Black Caucus and U.S. Policy in Southern Africa,” Africa 
Report 29, no. 3 (May-June 1984): 13.  
 10Ibid.  
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the public support and the Democrat support to force the congressional Republicans’ hand.  
What Congressman Dixon didn’t account for was that the CBC effort to force a change in 
foreign policy towards South Africa would cost as much as it did.  Wanting to force a change did 
not mean that how much was changed would be under the control of the CBC or its fellow House 
Democrats.      
 For House Democrats to have a legislative agenda against South African apartheid pass 
through the House would have certainly required wide support from outside the Congressional 
Black Caucus.  One example of this support from outside the CBC among House Democrats was 
that of Rep. Howard Wolpe (D-Mich.).  Congressman Wolpe was the established “floor 
manager” of the (1985 House) bill, one which John Felton stated “rejected motions” of 
extremely harsh sanctions that the Senate would reject.11  One of the rejected motions was from 
CBC member Ronald V. Dellums (D-Calif.), whose proposal could only muster seventy seven 
votes of approval.12  Felton had described that a new foreign policy was established, but what he 
did not say was that it was only a bargaining chip.  This was very evident with Rep. Wolpe’s 
lack of support for Rep. Dellums proposal, which demonstrated that non CBC House Democrats 
had already started to alter the original intent of the CBC.  Felton may have claimed the House 
led for ‘tough trade restrictions’ but in 1985 they could only have been ‘tough’ in respect to 
doing virtually nothing. 
 However, with South Africa once again on the political agenda in 1986, Rep. Dellums’ 
version was finally approved.  Could this have meant that the public demand for sanctions 
moved the House to consider harsh economic sanctions toward South Africa?  Steven Pressman 
                                                     
 11John Felton, “Rebuff to Reagan on South Africa: In the House, Tough New Trade Restrictions,” 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 43, no. 23 (8 June 1985): 1087.  
 12Ibid.  
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felt the Dellums bill had “little chance of passing (in) the Senate.”13  Based on Pressman’s belief, 
it was still possible that the tone of public perception toward South Africa enabled the 
Congressional Black Caucus to pressure House Democrats to change their mind and vote for 
harsher sanctions.  This was certainly very likely, as evidenced by Congressman Wolpe having 
switched his vote for the harsher sanctions from the previous year.  This occurred even though 
Pressman in 1986 felt, much the same as Rep.Wolpe did in 1985, that the Senate was likely to 
reject such a proposal for South African sanctions.  Thus it was plausible that the CBC did put 
some pressure on House Democrats using public sentiment as their mechanism for 
encouragement.  But as Pressman and Rep. Wolpe both believed, this legislation would not 
likely pass in the Senate.  This was why only a voice vote was required to pass the legislation.14   
 Due to the low expectation of passage in the Senate, the House felt no recorded vote for 
record was necessary.  This legislation altered the middle ground proposal in the House and 
turned it into a much more radical solution.  This action by the House must have then been done 
either as an act of unity; or when considering the previous statements of Pressman in 1986 and 
Wolpe in 1985, was done purely to pander to the American public.  The belief that the House of 
Representatives led the charge for sanctions was correct, but how much they were able to change 
was up to the mercy of the Senate.     
The Senate 
 The Senate, unlike the House, was under nominal Republican control, with a margin of 
difference of 53-47.15  With a Senate almost evenly divided, it would seem that for major 
legislation to pass would have required a bipartisanship compromise between the two parties.  
                                                     
 13Steven Pressman, “Stunner in House: Tough Anti-Apartheid Bill,” Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report 44, no. 25 (21 June 1986): 1384.  
 14Ronald Dellums, “House Amendment 924 for H.R. 4868,” Library of Congress, available from 
http://thomas.loc.gov; Internet, accessed on 19 June 2008.   
 15Ehrenhalt, 2803.  
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Thus any initiatives from the Democratic House would have required modifications to the 
initiatives in order for the Senate to reach a compromise.  However, within the Senate there was 
another party battle to sort out before having to consider the House initiative of economic 
sanctions against South Africa.  
 During the 99th session of Congress (1985 &1986) the Senate was put into a position of 
having to either defend its party leader, President Reagan, or attack his foreign policy position 
towards South Africa.  The work by John Rielly concluded that the American public and the 
American leadership had different perspectives on South Africa.16  With Reilly’s perspective it 
would have been left up to the Senate to figure out how to find an acceptable position (if any) of 
change, which was demanded by the House in response to the public interest towards South 
Africa.  This resulted in the Senate’s response being divided among three different positions.  
Each one felt they knew how to best cope with the substantial public interest in South Africa. 
Rielly’s work did not state how best to resolve the dilemma, only that three percent of the sample 
found U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa as a major concern.17  There was no obvious 
answer to this problem.  Only through deliberation could the Senate come to a conclusion as to 
how best to meet the people’s needs, as an answer to a problem that was wrapped up in a 
domestic cause that needed a foreign policy solution.  Without any guide for political reference 
the three different factions in the Senate fought to gain influence over the other two. 
 The three Senate factions that were fighting for influence were Democrats, moderate 
Republicans, and conservative Republicans; however, the real struggle for influence was 
between the Republican factions.  With the Senate Democrats as the party minority they were 
united in agreement to challenge the president’s South African foreign policy.  On the other 
                                                     
 16John Rielly, “America’s State of Mind,” Foreign Policy no. 66 (Spring, 1987): 40, 47.  
 17Ibid., 42.  
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hand, Senate Republicans had to take into consideration both President Reagan’s policy agenda 
of ‘constructive engagement’, and be perceived as being receptive to the public’s demands.  The 
conservative Republicans were cast as having decided to stick with the president’s foreign policy 
agenda.  The moderate Republicans were sitting on the fence and weighing their options before 
deciding what to do.  Thus the Senate Democrats and the conservative Senate Republicans each 
wanted to influence as many moderate Senate Republicans as possible.  Yet by Rielly’s 
perspective it would seem that the Senate Democrats wanted to use the public interest as their 
leverage of power, whereas the conservative Senate Republicans wanted to focus on how a large 
percentage of the public felt this was not a major concern in foreign policy.18   
 Senate Democrats needed to use the media as a means to gain influence over moderate 
Republicans.  One prominent Democrat that attempted this was Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA).  
Sen. Kennedy had spoken to newspapers, written opinion pieces, and even released his 
congressional comments to match with the public sentiment of taking action against the 
apartheid government of South Africa.19  Sen. Kennedy had hoped to use his status has a well 
known congressional member, along with his famous family name, to help steer moderate Senate 
Republicans into an alliance with the Senate Democrats.   
 Sen. Kennedy’s actions were considered by some to be “merely a sideshow.”20  Charles 
Krauthammer considered the actions of senators like Kennedy to be “not much more than a 
gesture ... (for) contact and leverage.”21  However, Krauthammer was clearly against economic 
sanctions towards South Africa. Further, he did not address how the Senate needed to drum up 
                                                     
 18Ibid., 42,47.   
 19Karlyn Barker, “Kennedy Says S. Africa Policy a Failure, Calls for Sanctions,” Washington Post, 
17 January 1985, 20 (A); Edward Kennedy, “A Call for Justice, Africa Report 30, no. 3 (May-June, 1985): 
10-13; Edward Kennedy, “The Sanctions Debate,” Africa Report 31, no. 5 (September-October, 1986): 
37-39.  
 20Charles Krauthammer, “Sanctions Merely a Sideshow in South Africa,” Chicago Sun-Times, 11 
August 1986, 23.  
 21Ibid.  
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enough support to thwart the current South African policy that had been under attack by the 
media and the American public.  Instead, he focused on the importance of Cold War foreign 
policy over public sentiment; much like what Rielly said he believed was a major dilemma for 
Congress to have to address.  But since Krauthammer was only promoting his opinion, there was 
no intent to address the public concern in a foreign policy debate.  His dislike for this Democratic 
Party issue clouded his judgment of how the sanctions dilemma was a combination of domestic 
and foreign policy politics.  Much like Krauthammer, conservative Senate Republicans also 
wanted to keep the domestic issues out of foreign policy politics.  
 Conservative Senate Republicans used the Cold War perspective as the reason to avoid 
South African economic sanctions.  Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC) was one of these conservatives 
that wanted to thwart the Senate Democrat ambitions for sanctions.  Unlike Sen. Kennedy, who 
counted on substantial amounts of help from outside sources to influence the Senate, Sen. Helms 
depended largely on legislative tactics to help realize his intent.  Steve Blakely termed the tactics 
used by conservatives like Sen. Helms as “professional” politics.22  The tactics described by 
Blakely were used by Sen. Helms in 1985 and 1986.  Blakely highlighted how Sen. Helms was a 
skilled politician, always trying to protect and promote his political viewpoints.  However, 
Blakely did not discuss how Sen. Helms elected to disregard the sentiment of the American 
people in ensuring his political foreign policy concerns were addressed.   
 The actions of Sen. Helms imply that it was likely that he kept domestic and foreign 
policy issues separate in his mind as he made his policy and voting decisions.  One could also 
infer that the Senate Democrats and the moderate Senate Republicans that did not side with the 
conservative Senate conservatives were unable to separate domestic concerns from this largely 
                                                     
 22Steve Blakely, “Helms’ Tactics Score Foreign Policy Victories,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report 43, no. 28 (13 July 1985): 1365.  
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foreign policy matter.  The conservative Senate Republicans hoped that, by using the Cold War 
as the reason for wanting to deny sanctions, their disregard of public sentiment would not harm 
their upcoming re-election campaigns.  This concern for re-election was also very much on the 
mind of moderate Senate Republicans.         
 Moderate Senate Republicans seemed to be more concerned with how their political 
support for foreign policy change would be viewed by both the president and also by the public.  
The approach to balancing party allegiance with political opportunity determined how moderate 
Senators decided to act.   In 1985 President Reagan did just enough to keep the support of most 
moderate Senate Republicans but in 1986 a majority decided to split over the difference in 
foreign policy between the public and the president.  Sen. Lowell Weicker Jr. (R-Conn.) decided 
very early in 1985 to side with appealing to the public, over party unity with President Reagan, 
by being the first senator arrested for protesting at the South African Embassy.23 
 The action taken by Sen. Weicker was a calculated move to appease the public and by 
being the first senator to be arrested he gained influence among Senate Democrats.  Since 
Sen.Weicker was often termed as a liberal Republican it would be difficult to define him as a 
moderate in this instance.24  More appropriate examples of moderate Republican behaviours 
would be senators Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and Robert Dole (R-Kan.).   
 Senators Lugar and Dole were classic examples of political tightrope walkers.  Sen. 
Lugar as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Sen. Dole as Senate majority leader 
were two Republicans that played important roles in the final outcome of South African 
sanctions.  Both Senators Lugar and Dole had sided with President Reagan in 1985 and had 
voted for sanctions in 1986. According to Felton, President Reagan’s 1985 executive order had 
                                                     
 23Karlyn Barker, “Sen. Weicker Is Arrested At Embassy,” Washington Post, 15 January 1985, 
1(B).  
 24Blakely, 1365; Barker, “Sen. Weicker,” 1(B).  
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just “merely ratified actions he and previous presidents had taken.”25 Felton’s statement lends 
support to the claim that in 1985 Sen. Lugar and Sen. Dole placed Reagan’s foreign policy 
agenda over domestic public opinion.  What Felton’s examination overlooked was the party 
politics that were used to thwart, temporarily, a mainly Democratic initiative.  Felton should 
have remarked how the action by Sen. Lugar and Sen. Dole was a tactical move to give the 
president more time in the hope that the call for sanctions would dwindle enough for them to be 
put aside for as long as possible.  Felton later claimed that in 1985 President Reagan budged 
enough to avoid sanctions but in 1986 he did not budge at all.26  By this latest statement Sen. 
Lugar and Sen. Dole were then justified in their voting patterns.  Felton’s remark also indicated 
that he held a more favourable view of sanctions in 1986 than he did in 1985 since he labelled 
the president’s actions in a much more positive manner in 1986 than he did in 1985.  It could be 
claimed that Felton was caught up in the moment, since he ignored how Sen. Lugar and Sen. 
Dole stopped the 1985 congressional debate when Lugar hid the legislation towards South Africa 
literally under lock and key, and thus ended any Senate debate.27  Sen. Dole described that the 
action was done to supposedly help maintain working order in the Senate.28  So it would seem 
the praise described by Jacob Lamar toward “the bipartisan respect Lugar commands” would 
thus dictate that deciding the proper time when the Senate Republican leadership felt it was 
appropriate to debate economic sanctions towards South Africa was a common political 
manoeuvre.29   
                                                     
 25John Felton, “Reagan Averts a Confrontation on South Africa,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report 43, no. 37 (14 September 1985): 1801.  
 26John Felton, “Hill Overrides Veto of South Africa Sanctions,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report 44, no. 44 (4 October 1986): 2339.  
 27Congressional Record 131, part 17 (12 September 1985):23583-23584.  
 28Ibid., 23583.  
 29Jacob V. Lamar Jr., “In the Eye of the Storm,” Time (4 August 1986): 8.  
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 As a result it could be said that Lamar and Felton did not take into consideration the 
Senate political manoeuvres that were used to fight for influence and political power by every 
member of Congress.  Just as in a game of chess in which you set up the pieces and wait for the 
right moment to strike, Congress was calculating what their individual actions would mean for 
themselves before deciding to act. 
Reflection 
 In the end it seemed the moderate Senate Republicans carried the day.  Though the 
official legislation (H.R. 4858) may have given credit in name to CBC member Rep. William 
Gray III (D-PA), after the congressional compromise initiated by Sen. Lugar only the bill title 
and its description came from the House.  Sen. Lugar had the Senate version of his bill inserted 
over the House version as the official text.30  In rhetoric the moderate Senate Republicans 
sounded more like they sided with the Democrats, but in reality they did just enough to 
politically satisfy the domestic issue of South Africa without totally jeopardizing the current 
foreign policy towards it. 
 In viewing the Congress as a whole of the House and the Senate, the fight for power and 
influence through the battleground of South African foreign policy is very evident. With many 
House Republicans supporting the House sanctions one must consider if they possessed ulterior 
motives.  Could the House Republicans not have put up a fight with the House Democrats 
because they knew that the Senate Republicans would lessen the impact of economic sanctions?  
This point deserves consideration given that the House Republicans had to have been aware of at 
least some aspects of Senate Republican plans with regards to South African economic sanctions. 
 There was a common perception that the Anti-Apartheid legislation that was passed in 
1986 was that of a compromise between the House and the Senate.  What has not been given 
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consideration was how much the influence of party politics in Congress were at work the entire 
time in 1985 & 1986 for the South African economic sanctions legislation.  When considering 
the actions of Congress in the Congressional Record this influence becomes evidently clear. 
DOMESTIC FACTORS 
 Domestic factors were believed to have made the economic sanctions toward South 
Africa conceivable.  The combination of media coverage, the lobbying work of TransAfrica, and 
the ensuing public opinion of outrage against the South African apartheid government was 
believed my many to have allowed the Congress to challenge President Reagan’s South African 
foreign policy.  
The Media 
 The American media seemed to have grabbed onto the appealing story that South Africa 
made toward the end of 1984, and continued for large parts of the next two years.  And as long as 
any aspect of South Africa, from its own internal struggles to South African related domestic and 
political events in the U.S., would make for a great story, it would remain a covered topic.   The 
continuous coverage occurred in both print (newspapers, magazines, and journals) and broadcast 
(principally television) news media channels.    
 To the media, South Africa was a journalistic gold mine for a broad range of stories that 
could be mined to draw the interests of readers and viewers, and help keep the public interested 
in South Africa.  Close to one thousand television reports for 1985 and 1986 indicates that the 
television media was determined not to let South Africa slip away from view in people’s daily 
lives.31   
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 Donald Culverson was one that believed this coverage was largely due to the “anti-
apartheid protest activities.”32  However, the perspective Culverson took had ignored, either 
accidently or intentionally, that the media was looking for a story, not trying to follow history.  
This was not to say that the media, which had a label of being liberal and thus biased more 
toward the viewpoint of the Democrats in Congress, did not sympathize with the outcry for 
change towards South Africa.  If anything Culverson might well have focused on how 
TransAfrica had started the protest movement as a public ploy to gain political influence.  This 
was much more likely than Culverson’s belief that the American public had spoken out against 
the Reagan Administration’s South African policy of ‘constructive engagement’33.  The media 
did not cover this story from the historical angle of opposition against South African foreign 
policy, for if it was following a historical trend then it would have also covered the foreign 
policies of other presidents from President Truman to Reagan.   
 Viewed in this context it becomes evident that the television news media was simply after 
a story that would draw viewers, and not a rebuke against one particular choice of foreign policy.  
This is also evidence in support of the reason for which the media covered certain stories such as 
TransAfrica and Democratic Congressmen who supported sanctions from the very beginning. 
Later they covered some Republican Congressmen, once the media began depicting the 
perception of a new public policy.  The overall coverage was largely done to enhance the 
influence of those wanting change, and then as a consequence to decrease the influence of those 
who did not want this particular change in South African foreign policy.  Thus it was plausible 
that the majority of television news media were only concerned with the story as a media event, 
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and not concerned with in depth research on what they covered actually meant in relation to the 
story.   
 The media interest in South Africa could also have been influenced by the crackdown on 
the media within South Africa.  The attempt to stop the media from covering the news in South 
Africa only made them more determined to keep more focus on the news events concerning 
South Africa.  Many press stories such as the ones that were written by William Smith used the 
press restrictions as an opportunity to overtly link it with U.S. foreign policy towards South 
Africa.34  In consequence, Smith had used the action of South Africa toward the media as a link 
to make the news media, in this instance himself and Time magazine, a major source of influence 
in the United States.      
 The type of influence the print media has typically pursued was influence within its own 
sphere, which is achieved by garnering more readers than its competition.  The media’s coverage 
over South African was no different.   A study by Eleanor Singer and Jacob Ludwig concluded 
that the press restrictions did not hamper the coverage on South Africa.35  With the findings of 
Singer and Ludwig it becomes plausible to consider that any drop in media coverage would then 
have been due to a belief by the media that South Africa was no longer an issue worth covering.  
Consequently, over time the amount of coverage would have naturally dwindled.  The passage of 
the anti-apartheid act in 1986 could have been a defining moment when the story of South Africa 
lost its appeal as a great news story.  However, some people believe that this was not the case. 
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 Danny Schechter believed that it was the press restriction that had lessened the amount of 
stories on South Africa.36  Yet Schechter did not regard South Africa as a story of importance to 
meet the viewer/reader demand, but believed that it was a story inherently worth reporting.37  He 
did not want to consider that when Congress overturned President Reagan’s veto the allure of 
South Africa would start to fade.  Schechter did not consider that any story concerning South 
Africa was linked in some way to its foreign policy with the U.S., because for him any story was 
used in some form as an excuse to demand change in how U.S. foreign policy dealt with South 
African apartheid.  Once economic sanctions were announced on various media outlets what 
more could be done to influence the viewing public?  Supposedly this would meet the demand 
for change, and it would become hard to maintain South Africa as a story about demands for 
change. 
 Not all of the media used South African domestic affairs to enhance their coverage of 
congressional politics.  Some media outlets, such as the Chicago Sun-Times and the Wall Street 
Journal, were more consistent in separating Congressional political battles from South African 
domestic issues and the anti-apartheid sentiment that was popular among the American public.  
The media that followed this type of coverage was often labelled as more conservative in its 
views than others like the New York Times or the Time magazine in their coverage regarding 
South Africa and corresponding events centred on congressional politics around U.S. foreign 
policy.  The more conservative media was more likely to believe in President’s Reagan’s South 
African foreign policy approach.  Thus it was quite likely that the labelled “liberal” and 
“conservative” media outlets had sided with their respective liberal and conservative approaches 
on how the U.S. should conduct its foreign policy toward South African apartheid.  
                                                     
 36Danny Schechter, “South Africa: Where Did the Story Go?” Africa Report 33, no. 2 (March-April, 
1988): 27.  
 37Ibid., 28.  
Congressional Anti-Apartheid Policy 23 
 
Consequently their coverage would become biased toward only supporting their point of view.  
However, media outlets with a more conservative mentality were in the minority with respect to 
coverage of U.S. domestic issues, South African domestic issues, and politics around U.S. 
foreign policy. It then becomes possible to believe that the media had a set agenda it wanted to 
push to shape the debate over South Africa.  President Reagan believed this was what the media 
wanted to accomplish.38   
 However, the media was not interested in pushing a set political agenda.  The media 
indeed did have their own opinion regarding U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa, which 
varied according to the views of the particular news station or print media staff; but at the end of 
the day the media was only concerned with selling a product.  This focus on product was due to 
the media’s concerns over its ratings or amount of copies sold, and that would subsequently 
determine each outlet’s influence over what people would see or read regarding the U.S. 
domestic atmosphere, in conjunction with U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa.  Each outlet 
strived to have a larger viewership or readership than its competitors, in order to extend their 
influence, and as a result to become more powerful in the media business than the competition.     
 The move for influence by the media to draw interest from the public was linked with 
how TransAfrica had launched its campaign as a cause for change of U.S. foreign policy towards 
Africa.  Congress had responded as a whole to the call for change, and the media was used to 
facilitate the interaction between Congress, TransAfrica, and public opinion.  When this 
partnership ended, the media lost its appetite for the story to continue.  But during this 
partnership, the media was largely the voice through which TransAfrica was able to lobby to 
enhance its own standing with the Congress.  In particular, TransAfrica used the media to help 
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leverage its influence in lobbying the Congress for a change in U.S. foreign policy towards South 
Africa.   
TransAfrica 
 TransAfrica was the African American foreign policy lobby that was very influential in 
helping to make economic sanctions towards South Africa into a domestic political factor during 
the 99th session of Congress (1985 & 1986).  This organization wanted to enhance its lobbying 
power beyond its main sympathizers in the CBC in order to gain influence among the 
government to help dictate how the U.S. would implement its foreign policy in areas in which 
they had an interest. A principal lobbying goal of TransAfrica was to help dictate U.S. foreign 
policy towards South Africa. 
 Randall Robinson was the leader of TransAfrica.  In regards to South Africa he wanted 
the U.S. government to help implement severe economic sanctions to speed the transition from 
the apartheid government in South Africa to one that had a majority rule led by black South 
Africans.39  This goal indicated that Robinson was concerned with increasing the lobbying power 
of TransAfrica.  Yet at the time of this article, during the Jimmy Carter era as president, he was 
struggling to get his message to be considered outside of the CBC and a few other congressional 
Democrats.   Robinson also stated the importance of using the image of the civil rights 
movements in the U.S. as the best way to implement his plan.40  These two items suggest that 
Robinson was looking for the right moment to use some mechanism that could help him swing 
the public sentiment towards his side.  Then, and only then, would Robinson have gained 
sufficient lobbying influence among Congressional members to press President Reagan towards 
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South African economic sanctions.  Without public sentiment to back his cause, TransAfrica 
struggled even to gain a strong position of influence among Democrats outside of the CBC. 
 Helen Kitchen paraphrased the work of TransAfrica and Robinson in 1985 as one of a 
“daring gamble” to force a change of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa.41  Kitchen felt that 
Robinson had gambled correctly in harnessing the public interest in a bid to increase his 
lobbying influence. Considering the remark by Kitchen along with the previous comments above 
concerning Robinson, it becomes evident that there was a missing piece of what TransAfrica 
needed to enhance its lobbing power, namely a Republican president.  Without a Republican led 
administration this gamble by Robinson would have failed.  Kitchen seems to have taken for 
granted the domestic “anti-apartheid leverage” generated with the domestic sphere of political 
influence.42  If President Reagan had lost his re-election bid for president there would have been 
a lack of demonstrated Democratic support within Congress against South African apartheid.  
Furthermore, it would have been very difficult for Robinson to persuade Democrats outside of 
the CBC to work against a Democratic president upholding long standing foreign policy.  It 
would have been unreasonable to even expect much CBC support in his cause.  Robinson had 
wanted the Carter administration to implement economic sanctions against South Africa but his 
lack of attempts to upstage President Carter showed he knew that he would have been fighting a 
losing battle for influence.43   
 John de St. Jorre believed that TransAfrica used Reagan’s re-election as a means to 
capitalize on “an issue as clear cut as apartheid” to rally the “domestic political climate.”44  Jorre 
was correct in his view of the value of domestic politics in causing Congress to consider the 
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political importance of TransAfrica and its public lobbying efforts to influence U.S. foreign 
policy toward South Africa.  However, Jorre did not consider the political ramifications inside of 
Congress.  Members of Congress stated that the system of apartheid was evil in a political ploy 
to try and gain the power necessary to dictate the legislative terms.  TransAfrica was happy to 
have Republican support but it needed to have Democrat support first before it pressured 
Republicans through the media and domestic politics to support their cause.  TransAfrica craved 
the domestic spotlight to enhance its power with the political circles in Washington. 
 Kenneth Longmyer believed that TransAfrica was an African American ethnic lobby that 
wanted to unite the black American population for political influence towards South Africa.45  
Yet TransAfrica’s effectiveness was not due to the domestic black support but by the greater 
numbers in domestic white support.  Of course, African American domestic support helped 
legitimize the cause, but as a racial majority the white support was what made TransAfrica an 
effective lobbying force for economic sanctions toward South Africa.  This was why Robinson 
wanted to have political support from outside the CBC and the Democratic Party.46  To have 
Republican support depended upon white American support due to the reason that the majority 
of Republican political support came from whites, not blacks.  In contrast with this, Longmyer 
seemed to simply conclude that white support was an added domestic political bonus and not a 
necessity.47     
 Sanford Unger noted that South Africa domination of the domestic headlines had 
“created an enormous public relations problem for South Africa in the United States.”48  By 
Ungar’s claim then it was evident that, before TransAfrica was able to grab the public spotlight, 
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foreign policy lobbying regarding South Africa was largely on the side of apartheid.  With a 
number of former congressmen that had lobbied on South Africa’s behalf it was no surprise that 
TransAfrica needed to gain public sentiment to combat the more affluent (and therefore 
influential) lobbyists regarding South Africa.49  It was likely that the former congressmen turned 
lobbyists had used their knowledge and previous contacts in Congress to thwart the efforts of 
TransAfrica.  Since the former congressman turned lobbyists had come from both parties it 
seemed like TransAfrica needed to win over Democrat as well as Republican support.50   
 By having made South Africa a popular domestic issue, TransAfrica was able to increase 
their lobbying influence among the political parties. Further, the public lobbying done by 
TransAfrica took the ability to lobby for South African foreign policy away from the South 
African government and its representatives in the U.S.  As the result, TransAfrica became the 
leading lobbying group with influence in U.S. foreign policy towards South Africa during 1985 
& 1986.  There were attempts by the South African lobbyists to combat the effectiveness of 
TransAfrica and its newfound power in foreign policy lobbying.  However, after TransAfrica 
was able to gain domestic support these attempts were largely rendered futile within Congress.   
 Without any effective means of gaining influence the opponents of TransAfrica resorted 
to the rhetoric of the simplistic Cold War strategy and attempted to label them as a communist 
inspired group.51  However, this attempt fell on deaf ears due to the lack of credible evidence.  
For if there was any truth to this farfetched claim then the other lobbyists would have surely tried 
to have presented this information to both Congress and the media, in order to stem the tide of 
anti-apartheid momentum that had built up over South Africa.  Yet it still could have been 
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possible for the media and the Congress to disregard this belief anyway, with TransAfrica having 
asserted itself as a credible source of power and influence that had gained the public’s support.  
However, the likelihood of TransAfrica supporting America’s Cold War adversaries was more 
likely a show of desperation.   
 With the tide of lobbyist influence having been turned some people, such as Allan 
Brownfeld and J. Michael Walker, wanted to try and discredit what they considered a liberal 
betrayal of America’s (and specifically President Reagan’s) cold war foreign policy.52  Yet 
Brownfeld and Walker failed to realize that TransAfrica’s actions were based on human values, 
and not on ideological principles, which was why a number of their fellow conservatives did not 
agree with their farfetched assessment.  Randall Robinson and TransAfrica surely had 
ideological beliefs, but the act of catalysing public support was a means to shape the foreign 
policy debate they had helped start; and was done in order to gain power in the Washington 
lobbyist sphere to influence both parties in Congress, and in this effort they were very successful.  
U.S. public opinion was essential to TransAfrica in their efforts to lobby Congress for a change 
in American foreign policy toward South Africa.              
Domestic Public Opinion 
 American public opinion was believed to have been the rallying cry that led the drive for 
Congress to enact economic sanctions against South Africa.  This was the assertion of 
TransAfrica and congressional members that backed sanctions, along with some members of the 
media.  Yet this perspective could make it seem that the American public was at one time in 
favour of the apartheid government, or that they were unaware of what was happening in South 
Africa.  In point of fact, the public wanted action but they gave no indication of how to go about 
making the change.  With this viewpoint in mind, one could suspect that the public opinion was 
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merely a cloak and dagger disguise used in the battle for power, in shaping a new U.S. foreign 
policy toward South Africa.  
   Congress had implied that the demands of the American public had caused them to 
reconsider U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa.  Rep. Howard Wolpe (D-Mich.) gave the 
credit to the “individual citizens” that demanded action to end apartheid in South Africa.53  
However, Rep. Wolpe’s comment regarding the public only referred to the broader story. His 
statement did not indicate how the public demand helped to make the congressional legislation 
toward South Africa different from President Reagan’s ‘constructive engagement’ policy.  This 
was because what the public did was to provide Rep. Wolpe, along with the other congressional 
members that voted for sanctions, with an opportunity to use politics to increase their influence 
on a foreign policy issue.  This was an issue that saw both parties use the American public for 
their own political gain.  It would be hard to justify Rep. Wolpe’s claim that the public action 
showed the “enormous power” of American public opinion.54 Rep. Wolpe‘s view would indicate 
that the public sentiment favoured the congressional Republicans most of all.  But this was 
unlikely the case with TransAfrica and many congressional Democrats, who had preferred 
harsher sanctions than what the Senate Republicans wanted to implement.  Rep. Wolpe was 
correct in his belief that “the political environment” had changed due to the public opinion.55  
Yet with public opinion unable to dictate congressional politics, it left the use of this domestic 
opportunity up to foreign policy political conditions.   
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     Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) was one Congressman who believed that public opinion 
could be used to help dictate U.S. foreign policy with South Africa.56  However, it seemed that 
he was just as concerned with how to enhance his own political power.  Sen. Lugar used his 
leadership on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a means to ensure that domestic 
support was consistent with his interpretation of it.  Lugar stated that his committee (Sen. 
Foreign Relations) was “the stage for the debate on South Africa” and that “economic sanctions 
may not force a change...but it would show the moral outrage of the American people.”57  His 
comment revealed that he wanted to influence how the change in foreign policy would happen.  
Unlike Rep. Wolpe, Sen. Lugar did not give the public credit for the change, and thus implied his 
leadership deserved the credit for having heard the domestic complaints.  Sen. Lugar was 
concerned about the economic decline in South Africa and stated that the new U.S. foreign 
policy could not “force (a) one man one vote government in South Africa.”58  The legislation that 
was passed was against public demand and though Sen. Lugar was correct in his belief it was 
clearly not influenced by the public.   
  The domestic concerns that were expressed were for the U.S. Congress to take action to 
make South Africa move away from its apartheid government.59  An article by Barry Sussman 
highlighted that the public opinion was in favour of the Congress taking action, but there was no 
clear consensus among the public as to whether the congressional challenge was more popular 
than the policy of President Reagan.60  According to Sussman, the domestic appeal was to help 
the majority population in South Africa gain the right to vote and for equal rights in their own 
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country.  Yet as Sussman noted, Randall Robinson and TransAfrica organized a great number of 
domestic public events.61  Thus it was plausible that the media-covered events were attended by 
people who supported the TransAfrica and CBC goal of harsh economic sanctions to force 
change in South Africa.  This contrasted with the greater number of Americans that did not 
demonstrate, who were unsure of how to force change but believed change should happen.  With 
this in mind then the Congress only had to acknowledge that the people wanted economic 
sanctions as a moral way for the U.S. to show their support.    
 The use of economic sanctions was well known due to the being raised in domestic 
public opinion debates.  Yet the use of sanctions was raised by TransAfrica, CBC members, and 
Congress members far more than among the American public itself.  As a result, the term 
‘economic sanction’ became used as a catch phrase to indicate the debate over economic 
sanctions, a debate that went on in Congress.  TransAfrica also frequently mentioned sanctions 
as they lobbied in public settings.  With economic sanctions mentioned so frequently it could 
have seemed that the public was demanding it, but this was clearly not the case.   
Steven Roberts, much like Sussman, had also expressed that public opinion was involved in the 
congressional decision to press for economic sanctions against South Africa.62  The news 
coverage by Sussman in 1985 and Roberts in 1986 revealed how public opinion was used, but 
their coverage did not follow how the domestic factor dictated economic sanctions, just that 
Congress had responded to the public demand.  The actions taken by Congress could thus have 
been not for public consent, but rather because of it.  John de St. Jorre concluded that Congress 
should take economic sanctions to “assume the moral high ground...politically.”63  His view was 
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that the public opinion had very little regard among Congress apart from allowing for a criticism 
of President Reagan’s policy.64   
 What should be considered as a problem for Congress was that there was no general 
consensus among the American public for them to follow.  The best way to dismantle the 
apartheid government was to use economic sanctions to force the change.  The public opinion 
preferred this general course of action but never became involved in what steps they wanted 
Congress to take.  As a result, any action taken by Congress could be justified with the claim that 
they responded to the will of the people.  This was true in the sense of the action to be taken, but 
not by the harshness of economic sanctions dictated in the legislation.  Anything different from 
President Reagan’s ‘constructive engagement’ was a change; however, the amount of change 
was not measured to see if it had met the public’s approval.  This was not a major concern for 
Congress. Congress simply used domestic opinion to help increase their influence in U.S. foreign 
policy with South Africa along with the power to make sure their legislation could overcome 
Reagan’s presidential veto.  Thus for Congress public opinion was just a tool at their disposal to 
use.             
Reflection 
 Domestic factors helped Congress alter U.S. foreign policy with the apartheid 
government of South Africa.  The media, TransAfrica, and public opinion were merely tools to 
assist Congress in its quest for more influence and power in the foreign affairs arena.  Although 
it was assumed this gave Democrats an upper hand in pushing for economic sanctions, the 
Republicans had as much of an effect using public opinion to insert their version into law, over 
one the Democrats preferred.  The futile efforts of a Democrat majority Congress in 1987 and 
1988 to force President Reagan into harsher economic sanctions offer validity to the belief that 
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public opinion allowed Congress to act and it was the Republicans in Congress that won the 
political war even though it meant President Reagan lost the foreign policy battle.    
CONCLUSION 
 The Congressional pursuit of economic sanctions against South Africa called for a great 
deal of fortitude and patience. Challenging the status quo of President Reagan also required a 
significant amount of political action in the Congress.  Yet without the vehicle of American 
public opinion, Congress would not have been able to override the president’s veto or even reach 
a bi-partisan agreement.   
 My original belief was that the Congress was simply engaged in a battle between the 
Democrat dominated House and the Republican dominated Senate over the severity of economic 
sanctions.  This was correct insofar as each had majority control to dictate the legislation in their 
respective houses of Congress.  However, a clearer view can be gained by examining all events 
concerned with changing the system of apartheid in South Africa.  The domestic concerns that 
motivated Congress to challenge President Reagan’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ 
allowed Democrats to initiate action but, given that this was a foreign policy political issue, also 
allowed Republicans to dictate the terms of the foreign policy legislation.  The Democrats, 
largely pushed by the CBC, stirred up public sentiment against South Africa.  The foreign policy 
lobby group TransAfrica, the media, and public opinion all assisted the Democrats in politically 
forcing the congressional Republicans to act.  The CBC and TransAfrica had specific measures 
that they wanted taken against South African apartheid, but the media and the public did not 
display any preferences.  The original House sanctions of 1986 were built upon the momentum 
gained from the previous 1985 and 1986 media coverage.  The media was driven by its desire to 
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sell a product to the public.  Moreover, public opinion in relation to congressional politics was 
not a primary concern of the media.   
 This lack of a unified domestic front allowed congressional Republicans to steal control 
of the political manoeuvring away from the Democrats in Congress.  The congressional 
Democrats were able to gain some influence, but the power over change in U.S. foreign policy 
toward South Africa remained in Republican hands.  As a result, congressional Republicans took 
the power away from their party leader, President Reagan.  Given that President Reagan 
considered South Africa a secondary foreign policy concern behind his larger Cold War foreign 
policy, it could be suggested that although he was not happy to lose his ‘constructive 
engagement’ approach of quiet diplomacy, he much preferred the moderate economic sanctions 
that came from the Republican controlled Senate.  This change in foreign policy allowed the 
congressional Democrats to claim a political victory but they would not have been happy with 
the legislation.  In the end, it was the reliance on domestic support that forced the congressional 
Democrats into this situation. 
 Domestic support for economic sanctions against South Africa had a limited window of 
opportunity.  According to Jacqueline Calmes, the 1985 congressional action for South African 
Sanctions was the third most important decision made in the House that year; while Janet Hook 
believed that the congressional legislation for economic sanctions in 1986 rated as only the 
fourteenth most important action in the Senate and the fifteenth in the House.65  Given that the 
Senate only made South Africa an important issue in 1986, while it was an issue in the House for 
both 1985 and 1986, could make it seem as though the House forced the issue on the Senate.  
This could have been the case but, as a result of my examination of the events, I believe that it 
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demonstrated the strength of the Senate and not the House.  The declining of importance in the 
House regarding South African sanctions in 1985 and 1986 also illustrates the desperation of 
congressional Democrats, and especially the House CBC members, given the shrinking window 
of opportunity, to have some sort of economic sanctions passed into law.  The fact that no other 
sanctions against South Africa were passed in a Democrat controlled Congress in 1987 and 1988 
would add support to this belief. 
 The Republicans in Congress thus could have realized that the limited effect of domestic 
pressure calling for sanctions would force congressional Democrats to compromise with them.  
Given that the increase in House Republican support for sanctions came after the House was 
willing to accept the Senate Republican led legislation would likely point to the possibility of a 
plan set up by congressional Republicans to dictate the implementation of sanctions.  This would 
have allowed the Republicans in Congress to claim that they listened to the public sentiment 
while at the same time thwarting the desire of Democrats for stronger economic sanctions against 
South Africa.  Public opinion may have forced a majority of congressional Republicans to 
publicly denounce President Reagan’s South African policy but they were able to stop the 
Democrats from achieving their political goals of severe economic sanctions against the 
apartheid South African government.  Democrats may have been able to call this a defeat for the 
president, and in some aspects it was, but they were also defeated by the congressional 
Republicans. 
 In retrospect, it is evident that issues surrounding the economic sanctions against South 
Africa were rife with ulterior motives.  CBC members were determined to use the success of 
Randall Robinson and TransAfrica to turn their foremost foreign policy desire into reality.  
Under Robinson’s leadership, TransAfrica was able to gain an increase in political influence by 
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allying the media with public opinion.  This allowed the common goal of the CBC and Robinson, 
that of pushing economic sanctions to the forefront of the congressional agenda, to be achieved.  
The public issue over apartheid gave power and influence to the CBC in Congress, forcing 
fellow Democrats to offer political support to their fellow party members.  Democratic control of 
the House enabled the CBC to ultimately get its way in imposing harsh economic sanctions in 
1986.   
 However, the House legislation was held under political deadlock in the Senate.  The 
Republican Senate majority was looking for an opportunity to turn the influence of the 
Democrats into their own political gain.  They were able to do so because the CBC was aware 
that South Africa would not always maintain its currently high level of media coverage and 
domestic interest.  The knowledge that the Congress would be under a reshuffle due to 
congressional elections could also be considered as a factor for the CBC and the rest of its party 
leadership to have opted for some foreign policy change.  They feared the possibility of pushing 
for too much would result in no gain at all.  In the end, the over reliance on domestic influences 
to move the Congress to opt for a new South African foreign policy proved to be too much for 
Democrats to control. In contrast, the Republicans in Congress did not have to rely on domestic 
support to enhance their political power.  It is also possible to draw the conclusion that the rare 
chances for domestic issues to alter foreign policy require quick action to ensure success.  The 
ability to rely on domestic support for a given issue, given its temporal nature, would only have a 
limited time frame of effectiveness.  This limited time frame was evident when considering all of 
the events that took place for Congress to enact legislation over President Reagan’s veto of the 
act itself.   
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 It is quite plausible to suggest that harsher sanctions could have been passed if the CBC 
had had more party support from within the House, especially, and the Senate in 1985.  Yet since 
there was not a great deal of support the Senate Republican leadership was able to block harsh 
economic sanctions from becoming a political reality.  As the 99th Congress was concluding its 
second session in1986, the frequent references to ‘bi-partisan support’ from both political parties 
provided an opportunity for Republicans to take control of the political debate.  Republicans 
were willing to compromise for sanctions, with the knowledge that in doing so the initial goal of 
the CBC would not be realized.  The Democrats may have believed that gaining control of 
Congress due to congressional gains in upcoming elections would allow them to increase the 
sanctions in 1987 or 1988.  Yet, if this was the case, the CBC overlooked the initial role of the 
domestic support, as it was hard to drum up support for a cause that was supposedly already 
addressed by Congress. It could also be stated that the CBC struggled to maintain unity with the 
rest of the Democratic Party, due to their control of Congress in 1987 and 1988, and once the 
domestic element in the unusual foreign policy issue was taken out of the political equation.  
Without the outside factors involved, foreign policy with South Africa was a secondary concern 
to not only President Reagan, but also became a secondary concern with many congressional 
members outside of the CBC.  The push for power was expended and the political desire to 
attempt another change of control in U.S. foreign policy towards South Africa did not have the 
necessary elements to once again force such a debate. 
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